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This paper argues that the number of deaths in a conflict can be a measure 
of duration and demonstrates that there are information gains to this approach. 
The  well-known  conflict  database  of  International  Peace  Research  Institute  is 
compared with the database of Center for Systemic Peace which includes data on 
the number of deaths in addition to length of conflict.  There are differences in the 
two  datasets.  The  number  and  distribution  of  conflicts  vary  however  duration 
analysis yields results that are robust over datasets. We also show that the number 
of deaths, as a measure of duration, challenges some of the results based on the 
number of  years as a measure of duration.  We can also argue that economic 
integration coincides with shorter duration of conflicts in terms of both deaths and 
years.  International  conflicts  have  a  shorter  life  and  have  fewer  deaths  than 
domestic conflicts. Geographic or ethnic characteristics of conflicts are not robust 
over datasets nor over measure of duration. 
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I.  Introduction 
This paper empirically investigates the duration of conflict as recorded, 
defined and classified by the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) and International 
Peace Research Institute (PRIO).  Duration is measured by both the total number 
of deaths and the number of years from conflict to peace. The number of deaths is 
the human cost of the conflict and is also a measure of intensity. Intensity can be a 
measure of duration since the sides of the conflict can be expected to work 
towards ending the conflict as human casualties accumulate.  It is possible that the 
sides of the conflict play a game to have the other side declare defeat by 
announcing peace or any kind of arrangement to end the conflict.  We borrow this 
concept from cultural economics and show that it yields interesting results. This 
paper, however, is not modeling the micro behavioral dynamics of conflict.  It is 
mostly intended to set the stylized facts about whether different types of conflicts 
have different duration in terms of intensity.  
During the last fifteen years, world trade as a percentage of GDP has 
increased significantly, people are more mobile within and across countries to find 
better jobs, and they produce more goods and services compared to earlier 
periods.  Economically, transaction costs are getting lower and the world is 
getting more integrated.  This economic integration of the world is not exactly 
synchronized with political integration since there have been many secessionist, 
separatist and nationalistic movements, violence and wars in the world during the   3 
process of economic integration as our data section analyzes; in the 1990s, 
compared to the previous four decades, the world has seen more violence.  
However, the duration of violence in terms of both the number of deaths and years 
was shorter in the 1990s.  Therefore, the economic integration era has seen more 
political disintegrations with lower intensity.  Economic integration and political 
disintegration have been investigated in a different context in the literature 
(Alesina et al., 2000; Alesina and Spolaore, 1997).  That line of research is about 
the endogeneous determination of the number and size of countries and 
governments and international trade.  This paper, however, is about the duration 
of political violence and wars and some of their  determinants  such as 
secessionist, separatist and nationalistic movements.  These movements are also 
considered to be politically disintegrating actions with high human and economic 
costs but have not been studied to date. This is the main contribution of this paper. 
More specifically, this paper focuses on the following questions: Do we have a 
longer duration in terms of deaths and years in wars and political violence in the 
1990s compared to the earlier period since the second half of the 1940s?  Do 
different types of violence and war have significantly different durations in terms 
of deaths?  For example, do international wars have more deaths than civil wars?   
Do civil wars have more deaths than civil violence episodes?  Does ethnic 
violence have more deaths than civil violence? These questions are answered 
within the framework of duration models which is a novel approach to modeling 
the duration of political violence and war.  
Political violence and wars have been investigated recently from different 
perspectives. For example, their connection with terrorist events is studied by   4 
Addison and Murshed, (2005), Krueger and Maleckova (2002), and Li and 
Schaub(2004).  The relationship among ethnicity, conflict and civil wars has also 
been investigated (Sambanis, N.,1999; Easterly, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000; Fearon 
and David, 2001, Khazanov, 2005).  Another line of research is connection with 
political variables such as democracy and their effects on violence and conflict 
(Mousseau, 2001; Minier,2003; Reynol-Querol, 2005).  Quantitative and 
historical aspects of civil wars have also been studied (Sambanis, 2002; Elbadawi 
and Sambanis, 2001).  All these studies investigate the causal connection among 
related variables.  They are not specifically concerned about the duration of 
political violence and wars.  
One of the few papers investigating the duration of civil wars is Collier et 
al.(2001).  They study violent civil conflicts over the periods 1960-99 to analyze 
the duration of conflict.  They estimate hazard functions based on behaviors of 
rebels and governments.  They find that the duration of conflict is determined by a 
substantially different set of variables from those that determine the initiation of 
conflict. Notably, the duration of a conflict is substantially increased if the society 
is composed of a few large ethnic groups, if there is extensive forest cover, and if 
it commenced after 1980. None of these variables has any significant influence on 
the risk of conflict initiation.  An implication is that the anticipated duration of 
conflict does not significantly influence the decision to rebel.  In turn, this 
suggests that the initiation of rebellion is not closely related to the prospect of 
post-victory goals. Another paper in the same line of combining theory and 
empirics of civil wars is Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000).  They argue that civil 
war occurrence and duration may be modeled as the result of a forecast error on   5 
the part of the rebels or the state with reference to each other's military capability.  
They state that unlike international wars, which are usually short-lived, civil wars 
are prolonged. According to the argument above, they explain that this would 
mean that either the rebels, or the government, are over-optimistic about their 
relative military capability, leading to errors in judgment that prolong wars. The 
duration of the war is basically determined by the ability of the rebel movement to 
remain intact, sustain itself, and avoid military defeat. 
This paper estimates the duration of different types of conflict for two 
alternative measures of duration.  It differs from the studies of Collier et al.(2001) 
and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) in terms of the duration and type of conflict.  
This paper analyzes the different types of conflict and violence such as ethnic 
violence, civil violence, civil war, international war, ethnic war, international 
violence, and independence, whereas Collier et al.(2001) and Elbadawi and 
Sambanis (2000) investigate the duration of only civil wars.  This paper 
empirically analyzes the duration in terms of the number of deaths in addition to 
the number of years from war to peace, Collier et al.(2001) and Elbadawi and 
Sambanis (2000) analyze the duration in terms of time from war to peace.  Also, 
this study uses a data set that has not been used in this manner before: the data set 
of Center for Systemic Peace (CSP). 
Therefore, both in terms of methodology and the dataset used, this study is 
one of the very few empirical articles in the field.  In this sense, this paper 
attempts to establish the stylized facts about the duration of various political 
violence and wars in terms of deaths and years.  The paper develops as follows.  
The next section develops the methodology used in the paper.  Section III gives   6 
the data sources and descriptive statistics.  Section IV gives the results and the last 
section concludes the paper.  
II. Modelling duration of conflict 
This paper empirically investigates the duration of different types of 
conflicts to understand whether they have a different length of duration in terms of 
deaths and years. We employ duration models to analyze the factors that affect the 
duration of a given conflict. Duration models have been applied to a variety of 
economic problems such as length of unemployment, duration of strikes, interval 
between purchases and time to business failure to name a few.  
Duration models analyze the length of time between the beginning of an 
event and its end. The origin of such models is in engineering where the lifetime 
of a component was of interest. Therefore, in the literature, the end of the event 
represents failure. Let the duration or length of time between the beginning and 
end of an event be a random variable T. Suppose f(.) is the probability distribution 
for T. Then cumulative probability F(t), where t is the realization of T represents 
the probability failure happens before t. 
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The probability that duration is at least t is given by the survival function 
S(t).  
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If the length of an event has lasted until time t, what is the probability that 
it will end shortly at time (t+D)? The hazard rate, l(t) will answer this question.   7 
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The hazard rate gives the rate at which failure occurs after duration t, 
given that it has survived until t. 
The Weibull distribution is widely used in the literature to parametricize 
F(t).  The Weibull distribution has two parameters q and a such that 
F(t,q,a)=1-exp(-(qt)
a). Then  
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For a<1, the hazard is decreasing over t and for a>1 the hazard is 
increasing.   
III. Data  
The chief aim of this paper is to promote the number of deaths in a conflict as an 
alternative measure of duration of a conflict. The number of fatalities in a conflict 
is available in the dataset of Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) which became 
available in 2001. Since this dataset has not been employed in empirical work 
certainly not as ubiquitously as the PRIO dataset we will first compare and 
contrast the two datasets before proceeding with the duration analysis.  
CSP   
Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2006 compiled by Monty G. Marshall, 
Director, Center for Systemic Peace. The data set covers all wars and violence 
recorded, defined, and classified by the Center for Systemic Peace for the period 
from 1946 to the present. Duration is captured with both the intensity of the   8 
violence and war which is measured by the number of deaths in the violence and 
wars and the number of years from violence and war to peace.  Our conflict data is 
taken from Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2005 of the Center for 
Systemic Peace (CSP).  This data set classifies the political violence into seven 
different categories: international violence (IV), international war (IW), ethnic 
violence (EV), ethnic war (EW), civil violence (CV), civil war (CW), and 
independence movements (N).  In other words, the episode type is listed 
according to two character codes. The first character denotes either a (C)ivil-
intrastate involving rival political groups; (E)thnic-intrastate involving the state 
agent and a distinct ethnic group; or (I)nternational event-interstate, usually two 
or more states, but may denote a distinct polity resisting foreign domination 
(colonialism).  The second character connotes either an episode of (V)iolence-the 
use of instrumental violence without necessarily exclusive goals; (W)ar-violence 
between distinct, exclusive groups with the intent to impose a unilateral result to 
the contention; or i(N)dependence-an attempt to forcibly remove an existing 
foreign domination.   
Descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical analysis are 
presented in Table 1. We employ two different measures of duration, namely 
number of deaths and length of conflict in years. The latter is admittedly a crude 
measure of duration.  We use it to complement our results based on the number of 
deaths and to see if there is reason to believe determinants of conflict duration are 
sensitive to the way duration is measured.  
One might be more inclined to think of duration as a time frame, however, 
when duration is analyzed, one is analyzing when an event ends. In that sense, the   9 
number of deaths is a valid framework in analyzing when a conflict ends. We opt 
to use number of deaths as a measure of duration following the literature on 
duration of cultural events. Simonoff and Ma (2003) and Maddison (2004) use the 
number of performances as a measure of duration in their analysis of duration of 
Broadway shows and Walls (1997,1998) uses box office revenue as a measure of 
duration for the Hong Kong movie market.  It is found that a one million dollar 
increase in box office revenue would increase the expected life length of a movie 
by about 2.5 times. 
We have 271 conflicts between 1945 and 2004. The mean number of 
deaths in a conflict is 90,922 and the mean duration of a conflict is 5.84 years.  
The number of deaths in the conflict with the least human casualties is 200 and the 
biggest in terms of human cost amounts to 2 million deaths.  Conflicts with the 
shortest duration in the sample are those that started and ended in the same year.  
We do not differentiate between say a conflict which lasted 2 months and one that 
lasted for 11 months. The duration for both of these conflicts would be zero but 
they would differ in terms of number of deaths, presumably with the one with that 
lasted only one month ending in fewer deaths than the one that lasted for eleven 
months.  The conflict with the longest duration lasted for 56 years.  
Table 3 presents the geographic distribution of conflicts. The majority of 
the conflicts have taken place in Asia. Africa is a close second with 77 out of 271 
conflicts. Latin America, the Middle East and the rest of the world have 
experienced fewer conflicts. Most of the conflicts are what is classified as a civil 
violence by the CSP. There are 68 civil violence episodes, compared to 50 civil 
wars, and 45 each ethnic violence and wars. Independence movements are   10 
relatively few in number. The world has seen 13 independence movements since 
1945. International violence episodes are 28 compared to 22 international wars. 
Notably, civil violence episodes are concentrated in Asia and Latin America and 
not Africa. Civil wars, ethnic violence and wars are heavily located in Asia and 
Africa, mirroring the distribution of total conflicts. 
In Table 3, the mean number of deaths of different types of conflicts, i.e. 
the human cost, is provided. The heaviest human cost is of civil wars. The mean 
number of deaths in a civil war is around 257,000. Ethnic wars also result in large 
human casualties. The mean number of deaths in an ethnic war is around 150,000. 
International wars are relatively less costly: the mean number of deaths is 50,000. 
Violence episodes, whether civil, ethnic or international, result in fewer deaths 
compared to wars. However, the CSP classification is not based on the number of 
deaths but rather the intent of the conflict.  
The duration of a conflict in terms of the number of years presents a 
similar picture. Wars generally last longer than violence episodes. However, civil 
and ethnic violence episodes last longer on average than international wars. Ethnic 
wars have the greatest longevity with 12 years on average. 
Table 4 demonstrates that in the globalization era, we see more conflicts 
than previous decades, hence economic integration coincides with political 
disintegration. In the table, we excluded the conflicts that started after 2000 since 
most of these conflicts are censored and therefore, would not give a true measure 
of duration. In the nineties, conflicts end sooner and involve fewer casualties. The 
mean duration in the nineties in 1.89 years compared to 9.13 years in the sixties 
and 8.31 in the seventies. Conflicts in the fifties were very intense. Even though   11 
the mean duration is not so long, 4.38 years, the average number of deaths was 
very high, at around 160,000.  By the same token, conflicts in the eighties were 
intense compared to conflicts in the sixties which lasted longer and resulted in 
fewer deaths. Specifically, conflicts in the sixties lasted for 9.13 years on average 
and caused  around 53,000 deaths. Conflicts in the eighties lasted for 5.93 years 
and caused around 65,000 deaths. 
PRIO 
This data is from the third version of the Armed Conflict Dataset 
developed and maintained by Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at 
Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International 
Peace Research Institute. Armed Conflict Dataset, a joint project between the 
Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Uppsala University and the Centre for 
the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). 
The dataset was first presented in Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & 
Strand(2002), 
The dataset codes years of conflict and conflict is defined as more than 25 
battle related deaths in a year. If a conflict between the same parties for the same 
reason is repeated that is coded as a subconflict. In our analysis, the unit of 
measurement is a subconflict. There have been 331 such conflicts since 1946. 161 
of these conflicts do not have any subconflicts. 44 consist of two subconflicts, 18 
of three and 3  each of four and five subconflicts. When we talk about duration we 
are referring to the duration of the subconflict as defined by the number of 
consecutive years. When conflict subdues, i.e. ceases to cause more than 25 
deaths per year, we consider it to be over.    12 
The Armed Conflict Database defines the intensity of the conflict in three 
categories. The intensity of the conflict is minor if the total number of deaths is 
less than 1000. The conflict is considered to be war if the number of deaths is 
greater than 1000 per year. The Armed Conflict Database also defines an 
intermediate category of more than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total 
conflict history of more than 1000 battle-related deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per 
year. Based on this categorization, we investigate how the duration of wars differs 
from less intense conflicts. 
We also distinguish between international and local conflicts. International 
conflicts include those between two or more governments or between a 
government and a group outside the territory of the government. Four types of 
conflict are defined in the Armed Conflict Database: Extrasystemic armed 
conflicts that occur between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory; 
Interstate armed conflicts occur between two or more states; Internal armed 
conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups 
without intervention from other states; Internationalized internal armed conflict 
occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with 
intervention from other states. We classify extrasystemic and interstate armed 
conflicts as international in this analysis. 
Descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical analysis are 
presented in Table 2.  We have 331 conflicts between 1946 and 2005. The mean 
duration of a conflict is 5.46 years with a standard deviation of 8.05 years.  
Conflicts in the sample with the shortest duration are those that started and ended 
in the same year.  We cannot differentiate between, say, a conflict which lasted 2   13 
months and one that lasted for 11 months. The dataset gives us start dates but not 
end dates.  The conflict with the longest duration lasted for 56 years.  
Table 3 presents the geographic distribution of conflicts. Of the 331 
conflicts 101 are in Asia, 43 are in Latin America, 111 are in Africa and 39 in the 
Middle East. 108 conflicts have start dates prior to 1990.  Asia and Africa stand 
out as  conflict prone regions. Conflicts in Africa tend to be largely intrastate in 
nature. Asia stands out with the number of international conflicts.  
IV. Results 
We compare the estimation results for the two data sets in Table 5. 
Duration is measured by the number of years. Estimation results are largely in 
agreement further confirming that the two datasets reflect similar realities even 
though definitions and classification strata are different. Conflicts in the 
globalization era are shorter just as international conflicts tend to be shorter than 
intrastate conflicts. Coefficient estimates are quite similar as well. Estimation 
results based on the PRIO dataset, indicate regional differences where conflicts in 
Asia and the Middle East are longer.  
In Table 6, duration models based on the Weibull distribution are 
presented for duration of conflicts for two alternative measures of duration.  The 
coefficient estimates are presented in log relative-hazard form. The similarity 
between the models for two different measures of duration demonstrates that the 
choice of measure of duration does not matter.   
In the period of globalization, the duration of conflicts is significantly 
different from before. When we use the number of deaths to measure duration, the 
hazard ratio is 1.337 indicating that the probability that a conflict will end is 1.337   14 
times more likely after 1990 than before. Therefore, conflicts after 1990 result in 
fewer deaths.  When duration is measured by number of years, hazard ratio is 
1.603. Along the same lines, the duration of international conflicts is also 
significantly different from the duration of domestic conflicts. International 
conflicts have a hazard ratio of 1.455 when number of deaths is used as a duration 
measure and 2.029 when the more conventional measure of duration is adopted, 
again indicating a shorter survival time for international conflicts. Conflicts 
stemming from ethnic differences do not have a survival time different from 
conflicts devoid of ethnic motives when we look at the number of deaths but 
based on the number of years we conclude that ethnic conflicts last longer. 
Finally, we investigated the duration of conflicts in different geographies and 
concluded that the duration of conflicts is not related to location when we look at 
the life of a conflict in years. However, number of deaths suggests that conflicts in 
Asia have a statistically significantly longer survival time, that is, are more 
deadly. 
Even though the results are largely in agreement as one should expect 
since conflicts in the world would be catalogued by and large similarly, it is still 
comforting for empirical researchers to see that relatively minor differences in 
definitions do not affect broad conclusions. However, differences exist which 
necessitate caution in interpreting results. Note that the CSP dataset does not 
indicate regional differences while the PRIO dataset does, when the number of 
years is used as a measure of duration. But the CSP dataset also finds a regional 
effect when duration based on number of deaths is investigated.  
   15 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the determinants of duration of conflicts. The well-
known conflict database of International Peace Research Institute was compared 
with  the  database  of  Center  for  Systemic  Peace  which  included  data  on  the 
number of deaths in addition to length of conflict.  The number and distribution of 
conflicts show some variation however duration analysis yields results that are 
robust over datasets. International conflicts and conflicts in the globalization era 
are found to have a shorter life. Conflicts in Asia last longer. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics: CSP 
Variable   Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min.  Max.  Description 
DEATH  90922  273607  200  2000000  Duration of conflict 
measured as number 
of deaths 
DURATION  5.84  8.67  0  56  Duration of conflict 
measured as number 
of years 
GLOBAL  0.26  0.44  0  1  1 if the conflict 
started after 1990, 0 
otherwise 
INTERNATIONAL  0.18  0.39  0  1  1 if the conflict is 
classified as 
international violence 
or war as classified 
by CSP*, 0 otherwise 
ETHNIC  0.33  0.47 
 
0  1  1 if the conflict is 
classified as ethnic 
violence or ethnic 
war by CSP, 0 
otherwise 
WAR  0.41  0.49  0  1  1 if the conflict is 
classified as  ethnic, 
civil or international 
war as classified by 
CSP, 0 otherwise 
LATIN  0.11  0.32  0  1  1 if the conflict is in 
Latin America, 0 
otherwise  
MIDEAST  0.16  0.37  0  1  1 if the conflict is in 
the Middle East, 0 
otherwise 
AFRICA  0.29  0.46  0  1  1 if the conflict is in 
Africa, 0 otherwise 
ASIA  0.32  0.47  0  1  1 if the conflict is in 
Asia, 0 otherwise 
* Center for Systemic Peace   20 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: PRIO 
Variable Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min  Max  Description 
end  1981  18 1946 2004  The year conflict ends 
duration  5.46 8.05  1  56  Duration of conflict measured as number of years 
begin  1977  17 1946 2004  The year the conflict begins 
global  0.33 0.47  0  1  1 if the conflict started after 1990, 0 otherwise 
war  0.28 0.45  0  1  1 if at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year, 0 otherwise 
africa  0.33 0.47  0  1  1 if the conflict is in Africa, 0 otherwise 
latin  0.13 0.34  0  1  1 if the conflict is in Latin America, 0 otherwise 
asia  0.30 0.46  0  1  1 if the conflict is in Asia, 0 otherwise 
mideast  0.12 0.32  0  1  1 if the conflict is in the Middle East, 0 otherwise 
Inter  0.20 0.40  0  1  1 if armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state 
group outside its own territory or  between two or more 
states, 0 otherwise 
   21 
Table 3. Geographic Distribution of Conflicts 
  Intrastate  International 
  CSP  PRIO  CSP  PRIO 
Latin America  26  37  5  6 
Africa  63  103  14  8 
Middle East  27  29  17  10 
Asia  67  83  20  18 
Other  25  34  7  3 
Total  208  286  63  45 
Table : Geographic Distribution of Conflicts (CSP:1945-2005, PRIO:1946-2004) 
 
 
Table 4. Distribution of Conflicts Over Time 
  Number 
Mean 
Death  Mean duration 
  CSP  PRIO  CSP  CSP  PRIO 
1950-1959  39 34 158923 4.38  5.56
1960-1969  40 53 52769 9.13  7.42
1970-1979  51 51 131912 8.31  6.37
1980-1989  42 51 64714 5.93  6.20
1990-1999  57 85 10878 1.89  3.94
Add Total?   22 
Table 5. Models of Conflict Duration as Measured by Number of Years 
Dependent Variable: Number of years 
  Hazard Ratio (std dev)
a 
Variable  PRIO  CSP 
GLOBAL  1.329** 
(0.182)  
1.520***    
(0.238)  
INTERNATIONAL  2.734**    
(0.473) 
2.581***    
(0.461) 
MIDEAST  0.450***   
(0.112)  
1.033    
(0.250)     
LATIN  0.827    
(0.197) 
1.441   
(0.384) 
AFRICA  0.600     
(0.119) 
1.018     
(0.228)     
ASIA  0.348***   
(0.073) 
0.899    
(0.196)      
Log(1/s)  -0.088***    
(0.043)  
-0.118**    
(0.049)      
LR test  c
2(6)= 60.17  c
2(6)= 33.37 
Log L  -517.625  -434.600                
# of Obs.  331  269 
# of Censored 
Observations 
30  22 
aCoefficients are presented in log relative hazard form 
*   significant at 10 % 
**  significant at 5 % 
*** significant at 1 %   23 
Table 6. Models of Conflict Duration – Alternative Measures 
Variable  Hazard Ratio (std dev)
a 
Dependent Variable  # of deaths  # of years 
GLOBAL  1.337* 
(0.215)  
1.603***    
(0.251)  
INTERNATIONAL  1.455**    
(0.276) 
2.029***    
(0.383) 
ETHNIC  0.980  
(0.149) 
0.599***   
(0.091)     
MIDEAST  0.932    
(0.233)  
0.940    
(0.230)     
LATIN  1.411 
(0.397) 
1.154   
(0.318) 
AFRICA  0.700     
(0.160) 
0.878     
(0.202)     
ASIA  0.630**    
(0.147) 
0.836    
(0.184)      
Log(1/s)  -0.730***   
(0.046)  
-0.096**    
(0.049)      
LR test  c
2(7)= 25.33  c
2(7)= 45.00 
Log L  -572.280  -428.785                
# of Obs.  269  269 
# of Censored 
Observations 
22  22 
aCoefficients are presented in log relative hazard form 
*   significant at 10 % 
**  significant at 5 % 
*** significant at 1 % 
 
 
 
 
 